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Identification: The missing link between
joint attention and imitation?
JESSICA A. HOBSON and R. PETER HOBSON
University College London
Abstract
In this paper we outline our hypothesis that human intersubjective engagement entails identifying with other people.
We tested a prediction derived from this hypothesis that concerned the relation between a component of joint
attention and a specific form of imitation. The empirical investigation involved “blind” ratings of videotapes
from a recent study in which we tested matched children with and without autism for their propensity to imitate the
self-0other-orientated aspects of another person’s actions. The results were in keeping with three a priori predictions,
as follows: ~a! children with autism contrasted with control participants in spending more time looking at the
objects acted upon and less time looking at the tester; ~b! participants with autism showed fewer “sharing” looks
toward the tester, and although they also showed fewer “checking” and “orientating” looks, they were specifically
less likely to show any sharing looks; and, critically, ~c! within each group, individual differences in sharing looks
~only! were associated with imitation of self–other orientation. We suggest that the propensity to adopt the bodily
anchored psychological stance of another person is essential to certain forms of joint attention and imitation, and
that a weak tendency to identify with others is pivotal for the developmental psychopathology of autism.
The discipline of developmental psychopathol-
ogy represents a uniquely powerful investiga-
tive approach for identifying the mechanisms
as well as the course of human psychological
development ~Cicchetti, 1993; Sroufe & Rut-
ter, 1984!. One reason for this is that, through
the study of typical vis-à-vis atypical
developmental pathways, it is possible to dis-
cern associations and dissociations among as-
pects of social and cognitive functioning that
are otherwise difficult to disengage from one
another. The present paper presents an empir-
ical study of two seemingly distinct social–
cognitive propensities among children with and
without autism— engaging in “sharing” forms
of joint attention, and imitating self-0other-
orientated aspects of other people’s actions—
that, according to our hypothesis, are under-
pinned by a common, intersubjective process.
This is the process of identifying with some-
one else. In identification, an observer regis-
ters and assimilates another person’s bodily
anchored psychological stance ~whether in feel-
ing or action or some other way of relating to
the world!, in such a way that the stance be-
comes a potential way of the observer relating
to the world from his or her own position. We
believe that this propensity determines uniquely
human forms of sharing and intersubjective
communication and role taking ~Hobson,
200202004!.
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Joint Attention and Imitation in Early
Typical Development
At the end of the first year of life, perhaps
building upon earlier forms of dyadic social
engagement ~Hobson, Patrick, Crandell,
García-Pérez, & Lee, 2004; Striano & Rochat,
1999!, infants engage in new forms of social
exchange involving shared or coordinated ac-
tions and attitudes toward the world ~e.g.,
Bakeman & Adamson, 1984; Klinnert, 1984;
Moses, Baldwin, Rosicky, & Tidball, 2001;
Sorce, Emde, Campos, & Klinnert, 1985; Tre-
varthen & Hubley, 1978!. In social inter-
changes grouped under the heading of “joint
attention” ~Seibert, Hogan, & Mundy, 1982!,
they monitor and follow the gaze of another
person ~responding to joint attention @RJA# !
and point to, show, and0or alternate eye con-
tact with reference to object and events ~ini-
tiating joint attention @IJA# ! to direct a person’s
attention, share experiences, request things,
or inform. Among typically developing in-
fants, positive affect is associated more with
sharing experiences in joint attention than with
instrumental gaze following or requesting
~Kasari, Sigman, Mundy, & Yirmiya, 1990;
Mundy, Kasari, & Sigman, 1992; also Adam-
son & Bakeman, 1985; Bruner, 1981; Rhein-
gold, Hay, & West, 1976!. Thus, sometimes
but not always, joint attention serves as both
the means to and expression of sharing ex-
periences of the world with others, where
sharing entails intersubjective contact and emo-
tional connectedness between people ~Hob-
son, 1989, 1993!.
From very early in life, infants also show
the ability to imitate, for example, translating
what they see in other people’s faces to their
own facial expressions ~Field, Woodson,
Greenberg, & Cohen, 1982; Kugiamutsakis,
1998; Meltzoff & Moore, 1997!. Beginning
around 9 months of age, they copy simple
novel actions involving objects ~Meltzoff,
1988; Meltzoff & Moore, 1998b! and may be
observed to reenact something of the style as
well as content of adult activities and copy
self-0other-orientated actions. In waving good-
bye, for example, or in feeding an adult with a
spoon ~Bråten, 1998!, the child shows role
reversal and responds in kind to the actions
shown toward the self by someone else ~also
Hobson, 1993; Tomasello, 1999!. One way of
describing such events is to say that the child
identifies with the person who waves or feeds,
so that waving goodbye to the other, or feed-
ing the other, is not only perceived but also
assimilated into the child’s own repertoire of
actions.
There is only a modest research literature
on the relation between joint attention and
imitation in early typical development, and
results thus far are not entirely consistent. Car-
penter, Nagell, and Tomasello ~1998! studied
24 infants between 9 and 15 months of age,
and reported correlations among the ages of
emergence of several social–cognitive abili-
ties, including aspects of joint attention and
imitation of instrumental and arbitrary goal-
directed actions. In contrast, in a cross-sectional
study of 60 infants between 8 and 14 months,
Slaughter and McConnell ~2003! found no re-
lation between performance in imitating ac-
tions on objects and gaze following or social
referencing. Charman et al. ~2000! reported
that among typically developing 20-month-
old infants, the tendency to alternate gaze be-
tween activated mechanical toys and an adult
was related to imitation of actions upon ob-
jects, once variance associated with IQ had
been taken into account. A further study of a
different kind was one prompt for us to con-
duct the present investigation. Carpenter,
Tomasello, and Savage-Rumbaugh ~1995! re-
ported a positive relation between joint atten-
tion skills and imitative learning in young
typically developing children and nonhuman
primates. Compared with chimpanzees, chil-
dren spent about twice as much time looking
at the tester’s face, and in each group, joint
attention in the form of coordinated looks be-
tween the object and partner was associated
with the propensity to imitate actions. In their
discussion, Carpenter et al. ~1995! speculated
that differentiating between looks to the tester
for purposes of sharing experiences, as op-
posed to looks for checking out the situation
or orientating to her sounds or actions, may
have been especially important, but these forms
of looking were not measured as the investi-
gators opted for what they considered to be a
more objective behavioral coding approach.
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The Case of Autism
Kanner ~1943! described children with autism
as having a basic impairment in the ability to
engage in “affective contact” with others. In
the late 1980s, more elaborated theoretical ac-
counts of the development of cognitive as well
as social features of autism emerged with a
focus on deficits in affective coordination and
nonverbal communication with others as cen-
tral to the disorder ~Hobson, 1989, 1993;
Mundy & Sigman, 1989!. Over the past two
decades, systematic investigations have re-
vealed how the children show disturbances in
their ability to direct expressions of affect to
another person, use facial expressions commu-
nicatively, and resonate to the emotions and
bodily expressions of others ~Bacon, Fein,
Morris, Waterhouse, & Allen, 1998; Charman
et al., 1997; Dawson, Hill, Spencer, Galpert,
& Watson, 1990; Hobson & Lee, 1998; Lan-
dry & Loveland, 1988; Reddy, Williams, &
Vaughan, 2002; Sigman, Kasari, Kwon, &
Yirmiya, 1992; Wetherby & Prutting, 1984!.
The children’s lesser tendency to look toward
others, not only in frequency but also in inten-
sity of eye contact, is characteristic, and prob-
ably an early marker of the syndrome ~e.g.,
Dawson, Osterling, Meltzoff, & Kuhl, 2000;
DiLavore, Lord, & Rutter, 1995; Volkmar &
Mayes, 1990; Wimpory, Hobson, Williams, &
Nash, 2000!. In the domain of joint attention,
children with autism show a reduced tendency
to use eye contact and deictic gestures ~e.g.,
pointing or showing! to coordinate attention
and share experiences with social partners vis-
à-vis objects or events in the world ~McArthur
& Adamson, 1996; Mundy, Sigman, Ungerer,
& Sherman, 1986!, even though they are able
to disengage and shift attention ~Leekam,
López, & Moore, 2000!, follow a head turn
~Leekam, Hunnisett, & Moore, 1998!, and de-
tect what is at the focus of someone’s gaze
~Leekam, Baron-Cohen, Perrett, Milders, &
Brown, 1997!. There is evidence that they are
less likely to share affect in episodes of joint
attention ~Kasari et al., 1990!, they are more
distinctive in their failure to point to and show
rather than request things ~Landry & Love-
land, 1988; Mundy et al., 1986!, and they are
limited in their responsiveness to others in
settings that would typically elicit social ref-
erencing ~Charman et al., 1997; Sigman et al.,
1992!. These areas of impairment appear to
involve not merely lack of attentiveness or
even affective responsiveness to other people
~Sigman & Capps, 1997!, but also a lack of
sharing of the kind that entails a partial move-
ment into or assimilation of the stance, the
attitude, or the communicative intention of the
other ~Hobson, 1993, 200202004!.
We stress two points that arise out of this
body of research. First, from a developmental
perspective, young children with autism have
been observed and0or reported to show re-
duced one-to-one intersubjective engagement
and responsiveness from early in life, as well
as impairments in joint attention and other
forms of “secondary intersubjectivity” ~Char-
man et al., 1997; Wimpory et al., 2000!. In-
deed, such impairments in person-to-person
engagement are also evident in adolescents
with autism ~Hobson & Lee, 1998!. There-
fore, it is highly plausible, if yet to be estab-
lished, that aspects of joint attention presuppose
qualities of interpersonal engagement, both
across development and in moment-to-moment
social exchanges. Second, the evidence sug-
gests that within the domain of joint attention,
there is a dissociation not only between initiat-
ing and RJA, but also between forms of joint
attention that involve sharing experiences and
feelings ~relatively absent in many children
with autism!, and those that reflect more in-
strumental forms of social transaction ~Kasari
et al., 1990; Mundy, 1995!. Therefore, there
are grounds for exploring whether there is a
common social–developmental process impli-
cated both in establishing emotionally config-
ured one-to-one intersubjective engagement,
and in “sharing” forms of joint attention, and
perhaps also implicated in other forms of so-
cial coordination such as imitation.
In this latter respect, there is substantial
evidence that children with autism have char-
acteristic limitations in imitating other peo-
ple, for example, when copying meaningless,
non-goal-directed actions and facial expres-
sions ~DeMyer et al., 1972; Rogers, Hepburn,
Stackhouse, & Wehner, 2003!. Yet, they are
able to copy others’ goal-directed actions on
objects and gestures when they are motivated
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or encouraged to do so ~e.g., Beadle-Brown &
Whiten, 2004; Charman & Baron-Cohen, 1994;
Hobson & Lee, 1999; Morgan, Cutrer, Coplin,
& Rodrigue, 1989; Stone, Ousley, & Little-
ford, 1997!, even though they may have a
reduced tendency to imitate even simple object-
related actions ~Charman et al., 1997; Rogers
et al., 2003!. They also have difficulties in
pantomiming actions in the absence of an ob-
ject, or in using an object for novel purposes
~Bartak, Rutter, & Cox, 1975; Curcio & Piser-
chia, 1978; Hammes & Langdell, 1981; He-
imann, Ullstadius, Dahlgren, & Gillberg, 1992;
Rogers, Bennetto, McEvoy, & Pennington,
1996!. Moreover, just as these children’s de-
layed echolalia and personal pronoun rever-
sals are unusual for their anchorage of the
communicative act in an original situation as
experienced by the child, but not shared with
~or experienced through! other people ~e.g.,
Charney, 1981; Hobson, 1990; Kanner, 1943!,
several studies have reported an incidental ob-
servation that children show imitative “rever-
sal errors,” for example, when they copy a
model who displays her hands facing out-
ward, by facing their own hands inward
~Ohta, 1987; Smith & Bryson, 1998; Whiten
& Brown, 1998!.
Such failures in imitating self-0other ori-
entation in actions have been the focus of
three published studies. In the first of these
~Hobson & Lee, 1999!, individuals with au-
tism were unusual not only in failing to copy
the self-0other orientation of actions, for ex-
ample, omitting to place an object against their
shoulder when the demonstrator had placed it
against his, but also in adopting the harsh or
gentle style with which actions had been dem-
onstrated. The authors speculated that whereas
the children without autism identified with
and copied the person of the demonstrator,
those with autism copied the demonstrator’s
goal-directed actions. The second study
~Meyer & Hobson, 2004! created the basis
for the present investigation. We tested
matched children with and without autism for
their propensity to imitate self–other orienta-
tion in four different actions on objects. Al-
though all of the children copied the actions,
those with autism were significantly less likely
to imitate the self-0other orientation of the
actions. Although half of the children in the
comparison group copied the self-0other ori-
entation of the actions on at least half of the
eight trials, for example, only 3 out of the 16
children with autism did so; and from a com-
plementary perspective, 6 of the participants
with autism imitated self–other orientation on
fewer than two occasions, whereas only 1 par-
ticipant in the comparison group did so as
infrequently as this. Five of the children with
autism, but none in the comparison group,
showed a predominant pattern of replicating
the actions as seen from their own perspec-
tive, akin to the “reversal errors” described
above. The third study ~Hobson & Meyer,
2005! demonstrated that children with autism
were less likely to show or imitate self-
referential behavior when communicating to
someone else where on her body to place a
sticker-badge.
Finally, what of the evidence for a positive
relation between joint attention and imitation
among individuals with autism? Again the ev-
idence is relatively sparse. In a study of 24
children with autism of mean age 34 months,
Rogers et al. ~2003! reported that affected
children’s performance on tests of imitation
~three manual acts, three actions on objects,
and three oral–facial movements! were cor-
related with the frequency of IJA for the
purpose of commenting, even when taking
developmental level into account, and also cor-
related with social responsivity but not after
variance associated with developmental level
was considered. Carpenter, Pennington, and
Rogers ~2002! also reported a positive rela-
tion between the presence of “joint engage-
ment” ~referential looking, i.e., looking from
an object to the adult’s face and back to the
same object! and imitative learning of goal-
directed instrumental or arbitrary actions
among children with autism, although they
also noted that their measure of joint engage-
ment ~i.e., requiring only one triadic look dur-
ing a session of 45 min! was not a sensitive
one ~see also Ingersoll, Schreibman, & Tran,
2003; Roeyers, Van Oost, & Bothuyne, 1998!.
Such evidence is highly suggestive, but lack-
ing in specificity concerning the links be-
tween different aspects of joint attention and
imitation.
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Hypothesis and Predictions
The hypothesis that underpins the present study
is that from early in life, there is a common
factor implicated in the human abilities ~a! to
establish emotionally configured one-to-one
intersubjective engagement, ~b! to engage in
“sharing” forms of joint attention, and ~c! to
achieve forms of imitation in which personal
stances or roles are reversed. This common
factor is a biologically grounded process, that
of identifying with someone else. A second
hypothesis is that children with autism have
less of a propensity and0or ability to identify
with another person, and that this is a source
of abnormality in interpersonal relatedness,
joint attention, and imitation.
Our hypothesis pivots on the notion of
“identifying with” someone else. One helpful
definition of identification is that provided
by Laplanche and Pontalis ~1973!: “Psycho-
logical process whereby the subject assimi-
lates an aspect, property, or attribute of the
other and is transformed, wholly or partially,
after the model the other provides.” For the
present purposes, it is appropriate to narrow
the definition as it applies to the setting of
an experimental task: to identify with some-
one else is to relate to the actions and atti-
tudes of someone else from the other’s
perspective or stance, in such a way that a
person assimilates the other’s orientation to-
ward the world, including toward the self, so
that this orientation becomes a feature of the
person’s own psychological repertoire ~Hob-
son, 1993, 200202004; Hobson & Lee, 1999;
Hobson & Meyer, 2005!. When, through iden-
tification, an individual shares experiences of
the world with someone else in joint atten-
tion, he or she both resonates to the attitudes
of the other from the others’ bodily anchored
stance and maintains enough of his or her
own starting state to make the sharing “shar-
ing” ~and not mere adjustment!. Moreover,
when the propensity to identify with some-
one else motivates imitation, typically this
prompts the individual to adopt the other
person’s stance in behaving and relating to
the world, rather than copying the person’s
actions per se. For this reason the individual
tends to copy the style and self-0other orien-
tation of the other’s actions, a process that
promotes role reversals in action and attitude.
Although we made three predictions, the
first two of these might have been anticipated
on the basis of previous research and0or alter-
native theoretical perspectives ~e.g., Swetten-
ham et al., 1998; Mundy & Neal, 2001!, and it
was the third that was more specifically de-
rived from our hypothesis. The first predic-
tion concerned the motivation and propensity
to engage with other people: we predicted that
relative to matched children without autism,
children with autism would be rated as spend-
ing more time looking at the objects, and less
time looking at the tester, in the course of a
test of imitation. In the second, we predicted
that children with autism would be less likely
to engage in “sharing” looks, and this would
be a specific deficit in relation to relatively
spared “checking” or “orientating” looks. This
prediction, although in keeping with previous
findings, entailed a novel focus upon that qual-
ity of looks that human judges can recognize
as reflecting intersubjective personal0affective
contact. Our third and critical prediction con-
cerned individual differences within as well
as across groups, namely that participants who
showed sharing looks would be those who
imitated self-0other orientation. This predic-
tion derived from our hypothesis that sharing
looks ~but not checking or orientating looks!
entail the same quality of interpersonal engage-
ment, namely, engagement that involves iden-
tification, that structures and motivates self-0
other-orientated imitation.
Here we emphasize that the present study
cannot yield decisive evidence that our own
hypothesis is either more or less valid than
several other theoretical approaches in the lit-
erature. Yet having said this, the prediction
about the relation between sharing looks and
self-0other-orientated aspects of imitation was
derived directly from the identification hypoth-
esis, and it is not obvious that it would have
been generated or indeed espoused by those
of any other theoretical persuasion. In addi-
tion, because the hypothesis concerned the re-
lation between sharing experiences ~Hobson,
1989! and imitation of self-0other orientation,
it was appropriate to seek for measures to
assess behavioral expressions of sharing, and
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because sharing per se is something that can
only be judged by a person, we sought to es-
tablish whether different kinds of look de-
scribed in the literature as joint attention,
alternating, or referential looks could be rated
reliably according to this further criterion. We
do not presuppose that such ratings are or are
not reducible to some combination of behav-
ioral ratings. If such ratings were to be inter-
preted as indices of “sharing,” still there would
need to be evidence that they corresponded
with judgments of sharing per se ~otherwise,
there would be no justification for supposing
the measures were of sharing!. Although our
approach seemed most appropriate for testing
our predictions, we also conduct a prelimi-
nary exploration of this issue.
Method
Participants
We tested two groups of children ~n 16 per
group!, one with and one without autism but
with learning disabilities, mild to moderate
mental retardation, and0or developmental de-
lays, who were between the ages of 6 and 14
years. Children were tested in their schools,
and selected on the basis of parental consent
to participate. All participants with autism dis-
played the patterns of impairment in social
interaction and communication, coupled with
repetitive or stereotyped interests and activi-
ties, characteristic of the disorder. We con-
firmed the clinical diagnosis by completing a
DSM-IV criteria checklist ~American Psychi-
atric Association, 1994! on the basis of sys-
tematic interviews with teachers, and by having
a psychologist with over 10 years’ experience
of using the Childhood Autism Rating Scale
~CARS; Schopler, Reichler, & Renner, 1988!
rate classroom observations of the children
according to this measure. The CARS covers
such domains as social relatedness, verbal and
nonverbal communication, repetitive behav-
iour, sensory abnormalities, emotion regula-
tion, and cognitive abilities. On the CARS,
where a score of 30 or above is taken to indi-
cate autism, the ratings of the children with
autism were M 38.2, SD 6.4, range 31.5
to 54.5.
The children with and without autism were
group-matched for chronological age and
language performance on the British Picture
Vocabulary Scales ~BPVS; Dunn, Dunn, &
Whetton, 1982!, the British version of the Pea-
body Picture Vocabulary Scale. The BPVS is
a standardized, widely used measure of recep-
tive vocabulary, assessing a cognitive ability
that is relatively more impaired in persons
with autism ~Jarrold, Boucher, & Russell, 1977;
Lockyer & Rutter, 1970!. Participant charac-
teristics appear in Table 1.
Verbal intelligence ~from the BPVS! was
very similar in the two groups: for children
with autism, M  54.2, SD  21.2, range 
28–107; and for the learning-disabled ~LD!
comparison group, M  53.5, SD  23.0,
range 23–100. To assess participants’ fine-
motor abilities and visual–motor integration
skill, children were tested with the Beery De-
velopmental Test of Visual–Motor Integration
~VMI; Beery, 1997!. The VMI presents a se-
quence of geometric forms that the child is
asked to copy with paper and a pencil. This
measure provides a standardized assessment
of the ability to integrate visual and sensory
information with motor ~finger and hand move-
Table 1. Participant characteristics
Chronological Age Verbal Mental Age
Participants M SD Range M SD Range
With autism ~n 16! 11;5 2;5 5;11–14;11 6;0 2;8 2;7–13;9
Without autism ~n 16! 11;1 2;0 7;11–14;6 5;8 2;10 2;5–10;7
Note: Ages are presented in years;months; VMA British Picture Vocabulary Scales age
equivalents.
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ment! output. Children with autism ~M 
77.31, SD  18.61, range  57–125! per-
formed as well as the developmentally de-
layed control group ~M 65.56, SD 13.62,
range 45–91!.
Previously reported procedure for testing
self-0other orientation
All of the children were well acquainted with
the tester, and she met with them individually
in quiet testing rooms in their own schools.
The tester and child were seated directly across
from each other on a testing mat at a distance
of approximately 20 inches. There were four
actions, each of which involved a different set
of materials. Each of the four actions was pre-
sented in two different ways. For example, the
experimenter picked up a small wheel with a
metal handle ~a castor from furniture! that had
been placed in the middle of the testing mat,
and proceeded to roll it from one side of the
mat to the other, either across the mat directly
in front of herself, as illustrated in Figure 1
~i.e., from left to right, neither away from nor
toward herself ! or, leaning forward, across
the mat immediately in front of the partici-
pant. The remaining three conditions involved
strumming a wooden stick along the serrated
back of a wooden frog, stacking boxes, and
tapping beanbags ~in each case, either toward
or away from the tester!. For each of the four
conditions, children saw the investigator pro-
duce the action in one of two possible orien-
tations ~close to or toward herself, or close to
or toward the child! on the first testing ses-
sion, and saw the alternative orientation for
each condition in a second session on another
day. After demonstrating each action, the tester
returned the object~s! to their original posi-
tions and instructed the child: “Now you.”
There was no explicit instruction to copy what
she had done. Details of our scoring proce-
dure are provided in the original publication
~Meyer & Hobson, 2004!. In brief, imitation
of self-0other orientation was defined as the
child adopting the examiner’s demonstrated
self-0other-anchored orientation, and there-
fore reversing the positioning of the object
and directedness of the action. The children’s
scores ~on which there was a significant group
difference! are incorporated in the present
study. Geometric repetition, a subclassifica-
tion of nonself-0other-orientated imitative re-
sponses, was scored when the child’s imitative
response involved a reenactment of the dem-
Figure 1. Testing arrangements and camera angle ~tester demonstration: rolling wheel near self !. @A
color version of this figure can be viewed online at www.journals.cambridge.org#
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onstration ~i.e., mimicking the original posi-
tioning of the objects in relation to his or her
own body!. There were only five children in
the study, each of whom had autism, who used
this as a primary response strategy, and these
individuals are also reconsidered in relation to
the present findings.
Current study: Joint attention and imitation
Coding and reliability. Figure 1 portrays the
camera view and testing arrangements from
our self-0other orientation study. The tester
and child were seated directly across from one
other on a testing mat. The camera angle al-
ways captured the child’s entire face, the ob-
ject, and the back of the tester’s head and face
so that the child’s actions, gaze patterns, and
facial expressions in relation to the tester could
be coded. In Figure 1, for example, the tester
is demonstrating rolling a wheel in relation to
self, and the child is looking at the object. At
the time of the original study, the tester was
unaware that the videotapes would be coded
for joint attention.
Videotapes were rated in a standardized
fashion. To structure the rating episodes, these
comprised both the model period, which com-
menced when the tester stated “watch this”
and proceeded to demonstrate the action, and
the response period, defined as commencing
when the tester stated “now you” as she handed
the materials to the child. The rating episode
ended when the tester provided feedback ~e.g.,
“well done”! to the child regarding his or her
performance and proceeded to remove the toy
to begin the next task. This structure was im-
posed to ensure that only discrete, standard
intervals of triadic engagement around each
particular toy were rated. As a preliminary
step, we determined that self-0other orienta-
tion ~either toward or away from the self, or
without orientation! could be rated reliably by
independent judges, in that there was agree-
ment on 23 out of 24 actions ~and in the re-
maining case a child had rolled the wheel
directly along the line that served to distin-
guish two of the categories!.
As a first step, an independent naive judge
coded the children’s direction of gaze on a
second by second basis using these rating epi-
sodes. Gaze was rated as being directed either
toward the tester’s eyes0face, toward the ob-
ject, or away. On the basis of eight partici-
pants ~n  4 per group!, the primary naive
judge and a second independent rater demon-
strated excellent interrater reliability in record-
ing the numbers of seconds spent directing
gaze to the tester ~intraclass correlation @ICC#
.75!, to the object ~ICC .94!, or away ~ICC
.95!.
The next stage involved the same primary
naive judge revisiting each look to the tester,
and providing a second rating with respect to
the quality and0or function of the look accord-
ing to the following mutually exclusive and
exhaustive scheme. “Orientating looks” were
those that appeared to occur in direct response
to an action, sound, or movement on the part
of the tester. “Sharing looks” were defined as
those looks directed to the tester that could be
seen to express a participant sharing experi-
ence through interpersonal contact with the
tester. They involved a deep gaze that con-
veyed personal involvement ~what Kanner,
1943, probably meant by the phrase “affective
contact”!, in contrast to checking looks that
involved glances “at” the tester. “Checking
looks” were defined as those looks toward the
tester that were used to assess or check out
either the situation or the tester’s response.
More detailed distinguishing characteristics be-
tween sharing and checking looks are pre-
sented in Table 2. We had established through
pilot testing that although this approach to
rating was subjective, in most instances the
ratings of intersubjective qualities of engage-
ment could be accomplished with confidence.
The second judge also revisited each of the
joint attention looks ~n 27! for six randomly
selected participants ~n  3 per group! and
~blind to the first judge’s ratings and all other
aspects of the study! rated each as being either
sharing, checking, or orientating in quality.
The two independent judges agreed on 24
~89%! of the 27 looks ~k  .83, excellent
agreement according to Landis & Koch, 1977!.
There were 6 looks that both judges agreed
were “orientating,” 8 looks that both agreed
were “checking,” and 10 looks which both
agreed were “sharing.” The three remaining
looks were all judged to be “sharing” looks by
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one rater and “checking” looks by the other.
An alternative approach is to consider esti-
mates of reliability of sharing versus all other
kinds of look ~k .78!, checking versus other
kinds of look ~k .76!, and orientating versus
other kinds of look ~k 1.0!. These levels of
agreement may appear unusually high, but
mostly it was straightforward to “feel” ~and
judge! whether the looks seen on videotape
were sharing, expressive of interpersonal en-
gagement; checking, indicative of glancing up
to check the tester’s face for a reaction or
instruction; or orientating where the tester made
a clear movement or sound that attracted the
child’s attention.
We explored a further approach to rating
the looks. In our view, the definitions we were
using were specific and appropriate to what
we were studying and also effective ~opera-
tionally! insofar as they yielded satisfactory
interrater reliabilities in the judgments of qual-
ities of looking. However, we felt it would
augment the study if we provided further de-
scription of complementary behavioral indi-
ces corresponding to the different categories
of alternating looks. Therefore, we returned to
our original ratings, and determined the dura-
tion of every look, where, perhaps, sharing
looks might be expected to be longer than
other kinds of look. It turned out that for both
groups of participants, over 90% of each kind
of look lasted for 1 s or less, and those looks
that lasted between 2 and 3 s were distributed
across the categories of look. The one look
lasting 4 s was a sharing look by a child with
autism. Second, we asked a new rater who
was unaware of the nature of the study and the
classes of look, to watch each look and record
whether it was accompanied by a smile, where
again, it might have been supposed that smil-
ing would characterize sharing looks. Among
children with autism, 8 ~67%! of the 12 shar-
ing looks were accompanied by smiles, as were
10 ~29%! of the 35 checking looks and 3 ~21%!
of the 14 orientating looks. Among children in
the comparison group, 18 ~51%! of the 35
sharing looks were accompanied by smiles, as
were 32 ~42%! of the 77 checking looks and
15 ~31%! out of the 49 orientating looks. These
results indicate that many sharing looks were
neither long nor accompanied by smiles and
that frequently smiles accompanied other kinds
of look.
Summary scores. The total testing ~and there-
fore rating! time was about 1.5 min in length,
but there were minor differences in total dura-
tion between the groups ~for the children with
autism: M 80 s, SD 6 s, range 71–94 s;
and for the children in the comparison group:
M  95 s, SD  19 s, range  52–124 s!. In
addition, although the entire duration of the
rating episodes ~100%! were easily coded for
most of the children ~11 of the 16 children in
the comparison group and 14 of the 16 chil-
dren with autism!, for the remaining 7 chil-
dren, there were brief moments when the
child’s face was out of view of the camera or
the tester’s head blocked view of the child’s
gaze. For these reasons, results were consid-
ered on the basis of percentage of total rate-
able time ~for directedness, a durational code!
and rate of looks per rateable minute ~for shar-
ing, checking, and orientating looks, a fre-
Table 2. Distinguishing features of sharing and checking looks
Features of Looks
Reciprocity Depth Contact
Sharing Reciprocal: The participant
appears to register that the tester
is also looking to the participant.
Deep: The look is
into the eyes of
the tester.
Personal: The look manifests
affective contact with the
tester.
Checking Nonreciprocal: The participant
appears to look to the tester
without registering the tester’s
look to the participant.
Superficial: The look
is at the eyes of
the tester.
Impersonal: The look appears
to have the goal of monitor-
ing the tester’s actions.
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quency code!. The six variables of interest
were thus percentage of time spent looking at
the tester, the object, or away and the rate of
looks per minute to the tester that were “shar-
ing,” “checking,” or “orientating” in quality.
Results
For our principal a priori predictions, the data
are analyzed using one-tailed tests.
Directedness of gaze
The descriptive data for directedness of gaze
appear in Table 3. The first point to note is
how closely similar the groups were in how
rarely they looked away from the tester and
materials, on average about 1% of the time.
Next, it may be observed that although both
groups of children spent most of their time
looking at the objects, the children with au-
tism did so for a higher percentage ~over 90%!
of the period, t ~30!  2.49, p , .05, two
tailed, with a medium effect size ~d  .7;
Cohen, 1992!. Finally, there is a striking group
difference in the deployment of gaze toward
the tester: The children with autism looked at
the tester for less than half as much time as
children in the comparison group ~Ms 5 and
12%, respectively!, t ~30!  2.92, p , .01,
one tailed, again with a large effect size ~d
.82!.
Quality of joint attention looks
Next we consider the number of each kind of
joint attention look ~sharing, checking, and
orientating! to the tester. Table 4 conveys how,
as a group, children with autism showed fewer
of each kind of look. As we predicted, there
was a group difference for sharing looks
t ~30!  1.78, p , .05, one tailed, d  .43.
When we consider checking looks, t ~30! 
2.19, p , .05, two tailed, d  .57, and ori-
entating looks, t ~30!  3.37, p , .05, two
tailed, d  .88, a similar pattern is evident.
Indeed, at this level of analysis, the largest
effect size ~and difference between the groups!
appears to be with respect to orientating looks,
followed by checking looks, and then sharing
looks.
However, when we consider quality of joint
attention by individual participants, a differ-
ent pattern emerges. As can be seen in Fig-
ure 2, 11 of the 16 children with autism
compared with only 5 of the comparison chil-
dren failed to engage in a single sharing look
~Fisher exact p  .038, one tailed!. This was
not the case for other kinds of look. All but
four of the children with autism ~and one of
the comparison children! showed at least one
checking look and all but 5 of the children
with autism and 2 of the comparison children
showed at least one orientating look. Nonpara-
metric repeated-measures comparisons con-
firmed that among participants with autism,
the numbers of children engaging in at least
one sharing, checking, and orientating look
were not the same ~Cochran Q  7.82, p 
.02!. Follow-up Wilcoxon Sign Tests revealed
that, within the group of children with autism,
fewer participants engaged in sharing than
checking looks ~z  2.65, p , .01! and in
sharing than orientating looks ~z  2.12,
p, .05! whereas checking looks and orientat-
ing looks occurred for similar numbers of chil-
dren ~z.38, p .71!. For the children in
the comparison group, by contrast, the distri-
Table 3. Distribution of participants’ gaze
Percentage of Time Looking
Toward Tester Toward Object Away
M SD Range M SD Range M SD Range
With autism ~n 16! 5.32 5.01 0–15 93.41 5.28 85–98 1.34 2.27 0–8
Without autism ~n 16! 12.05 7.70 1–24 87.14 8.57 68–99 0.81 1.92 0–7
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butions were not significantly different for
numbers of children showing each kind of look
at least once ~Cochran Q 4.33, p .12, ns!.
Therefore, although we had not made a spe-
cific prediction about whether a limited ten-
dency to engage in sharing looks would be
because of group differences in frequency of
looks or number of individual children who
failed to show any such looks, the two mea-
sures yield complementary indices of the
children’s propensity for intersubjective en-
gagement. Whereas children with autism en-
gaged in less joint attention overall, relative to
children in the comparison group, there were
also a high number of children with autism
who failed to engage in sharing looks at all, a
finding specific both to type of look and to
diagnostic group.
Sharing looks and imitation
of self-0other orientation
Our third prediction concerned the relation-
ship between a specific quality of joint atten-
tion, involving sharing looks, and a specific
aspect of imitation, the propensity to imitate
the self-0other-orientated aspects of the tester’s
actions. The children’s performance on self-0
other orientation was evaluated in our previ-
ous investigation ~Meyer & Hobson, 2004!
and we present histograms of those results
and map on data from the present study in
Figures 3 and 4. As we had predicted, children
who had a propensity to engage in sharing
looks were more likely to imitate self-0other
orientation across the entire sample, Spear-
man r ~32!  .54, p , .001, one tailed. As
illustrated in Figures 3 and 4, this was the case
separately for the children with autism, Spear-
man r ~16! .49, p , .05, one tailed, and for
those in the comparison group, Spearman r
~16!  .47, p , .05, one tailed. By contrast,
the rate per minute of other kinds of looking
was not related to the children’s scores on
imitation of self–other orientation: for check-
ing looks, Spearman r ~32!  .28, and for
orientating looks, Spearman r ~32!  .01.
Therefore, the positive result was specific to
those looks which involved sharing.
Across the entire sample, there was a sig-
nificant correlation between rates of checking
and rates of sharing looks, Spearman r ~32!
.62. Given this, there was a significant differ-
ence between the correlations for rates of shar-
Table 4. Frequency of sharing, checking, and orientating looks
Rate Per Minute for Each Type of Look
Sharing Checking Orientating
M SD Range M SD Range M SD Range
With autism ~n 16! 0.57 1.11 0–3.85 1.60 1.97 0– 6.43 0.65 0.53 0–1.54
Without autism ~n 16! 1.45 1.64 0–5.05 3.18 2.12 0– 6.98 1.94 1.44 0– 4.33
Figure 2. The number of children showing at least one
sharing, checking, and orientating look. @A color version
of this figure can be viewed online at www.journals.cam-
bridge.org#
Identification: The missing link? 421
ing and for rates of checking looks with
imitation of self–other orientation ~t  1.91,
p , .05, one tailed!. However, this difference
of .26 between the correlations should be in-
terpreted with caution given the small sample
size and hence low reliability for a difference
of this magnitude ~90% confidence interval
.03–.49!.
From Figure 3, it can be seen in the darker
portions of the bars how all five children with
autism who ever engaged in sharing looks,
also imitated self–other orientation at least
twice. From a complementary perspective, all
six of the children with autism who imitated
self–other orientation on fewer than two oc-
casions also failed to engage in any sharing
Figure 3. Participants with autism ~n16!: sharing looks superimposed on self-0other imitation scores.
@A color version of this figure can be viewed online at www.journals.cambridge.org#
Figure 4. Participants in the comparison group ~n  16!: sharing looks superimposed on self-0other
imitation scores. @A color version of this figure can be viewed online at www.journals.cambridge.org#
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looks. In contrast, there were five children in
this group who showed some adjustment to
self–other orientation without sharing looks,
which raises the question of whether there
might be other routes to this form of response
~e.g., understanding the action as toward
or away from an agent’s body, or identifying
with someone without this being reflected in
looking!.
Both self–other imitation and sharing looks
were more frequent in the comparison chil-
dren, yet Figure 4 illustrates how a similar
pattern of the relation between self–other im-
itation and sharing looks is present. Of the
seven comparison children who imitated self–
other orientation on four or more occasions,
six of these engaged in sharing looks, and four
of these children did so at a rate of over two
per minute. The one child in the comparison
group who imitated self-0other orientation on
fewer than two occasions failed to engage in
any sharing looks.
Developmental considerations
Chronological age and profiles of looking.
Across the sample of children, as well as within
each group, those who were younger tended
to look toward the tester more. Overall, there
was an inverse relationship between chrono-
logical age and joint attention for sharing looks,
Spearman r ~32!  .51, p , .01, checking
looks, Spearman r ~32!.36, p , .05, and
orientating looks, Spearman r ~32!  .46,
p , .01. In this regard, the tester had noted
how some of the older children and adoles-
cents tended to show more ~perhaps norma-
tive! social inhibition, and look to her less
during interactions.
However, the pattern appeared to be differ-
ent in each group. For children with autism,
only sharing looks decreased significantly with
age, Spearman r ~16!.61, p, .05 ~check-
ing r  .25, orientating r  .08!. The
inverse correlation between chronological age
and sharing looks was significantly stronger
than that between chronological age and check-
ing looks or orienting looks ~t  1.77 and
1.80, p , .05, one tailed, respectively!. By
way of illustration, four out of the five chil-
dren with autism who ever showed a sharing
look were under 10 years, and only one of the
10 children over this age ever showed such a
look.
The picture was different for the children
without autism. Within this group, only check-
ing and orientating looks decreased signifi-
cantly with age, Spearman r ~16!  .50,
p, .05, and r ~16!.78, p, .001, respec-
tively ~sharing r  .38!. Here, the inverse
correlation between chronological age and
sharing looks was significantly weaker than
that for orientating looks ~t 1.96, p , .05!,
but not for checking looks. Despite this, the
inverse correlation between chronological age
and sharing looks was not significantly differ-
ent between the groups ~z.78, ns!.
Overall, therefore, there was suggestive ev-
idence that the inverse relation between age
and sharing looks vis-à-vis other kinds of look
was specific to the participants with autism.
Chronological age and self-0other-orientated
imitation. Across the sample, chronological
age was not correlated with self-0other-
orientated imitation, r ~32! .02. Once again,
however, the associations between chronolog-
ical age and self-0other-orientated imitation
were different within the participants of each
group. In the case of children without autism,
it appeared that the older children were non-
significantly more likely to adopt self-0other-
orientated imitation ~r  .45!, whereas the
nonsignificant association was in the opposite
direction for participants with autism ~r 
.25!, and the difference between these cor-
relations was significant ~z  1.89, p , .05!.
These results present something of a para-
dox. Why should children with autism not be
showing the expected age-related improve-
ments on the imitation task? Perhaps sharing
looks hold the key.
Chronological age and sharing looks revisited.
When we considered the variance associated
with chronological age, the relation between
sharing looks and imitation of self-0other ori-
entation remained both across the groups, and
for the children with autism: partial r ~32! 
.64, partial r ~16!  .44 ~Cohen & Cohen,
1983!. It is more striking that, when the vari-
ance associated with sharing looks was con-
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sidered for the children with autism, the relation
between chronological age and imitation of
self-0other orientation changed from r.25
to partial r .07. This result provides supple-
mentary evidence that the association be-
tween sharing looks and self-0other-orientated
imitation is critical for children with autism.
Developmental abilities. Only one out of six
correlations between each kind of look and
verbal MA and verbal IQ was significant when
considered in isolation ~and therefore this was
of uncertain status!: verbal MA was nega-
tively correlated with orientating looks at a
level of .43. In addition, VMI ability was
not significantly associated with sharing looks,
either within or across the groups.
Further observations
The group of 5 ~out of the 16! children with
autism who engaged in sharing looks spent a
relatively high proportion of time looking at
the tester ~M  11%, SD  4.99!, although
there were individual differences in this re-
gard ~range  3.4–15.4%!. They showed a
broad range of cognitive ability ~IQ range 
43–107! and chronological age ~range  5
years, 11 months to 12 years, 11 months!.
From a complementary perspective, the five
children in the comparison group who did not
engage in any sharing looks were all far be-
low their group mean in the percent of time
they spent looking at the tester ~range 1.2–
9.2%!, and were also in the lower range of
cognitive ability ~IQ range 30–71!.
In our original study, there were five chil-
dren with autism who were unusual in that
they used “geometric repetition” as their pri-
mary response mode of imitating. For the ma-
jority of their imitative responses, these
children copied the orientation of the object as
they had observed it relative to themselves,
exactly as had happened in the demonstration.
This group of children were relatively low in
the time they spent looking at the tester ~be-
tween 2 and 7% of the time! vis-à-vis the
object ~range  92–98%!. Only one of the
five children ever engaged in a sharing look,
although all five showed checking looks and
three showed orientating looks. Of the three
children with autism who imitated self-0other
orientation as a principal response mode, two
were unusual in looking at the tester 13 and
14% of the time, which was above the mean
of the children in the comparison group. The
third child was also unusual in that he never
looked in the tester’s eyes during the imitation
tasks, and during classroom interactions, ap-
peared to avoid eye contact as if he might find
it overwhelming.
Discussion
In the introduction to this paper, we drew at-
tention to evidence that renders it plausible
that the process of identification is operative
in certain forms of interpersonal engagement,
joint attention, and imitation that characterize
typically developing infants, and that this pro-
cess is specifically impaired in children with
autism. Our reasoning was that if, as had al-
ready been demonstrated, individuals with au-
tism were less prone to copy the self-0other
orientation of someone else’s actions, then this
probably reflected failures in identification that
would also be manifest in other indices of
interpersonal engagement.
Our first prediction was inspired by the
work of Carpenter et al. ~1995!, who demon-
strated a relation between joint attention and
imitation in typically developing children and
chimpanzees. Like these authors, we consid-
ered that an individual who copies a person’s
way of behaving is more likely to have en-
gaged with that person in joint attention,
whereas one who does not might be preoccu-
pied with the object acted upon. Therefore,
we predicted that when compared with con-
trol participants on our imitation task, those
with autism would spend relatively more time
focused upon the object than the demonstra-
tor. As in the Carpenter et al. ~1995! study,
and in keeping with other evidence in the lit-
erature ~Kasari et al., 1990!, participants in
both groups spent the majority of time look-
ing at the objects. However, these results also
provided further evidence consistent with other
literature ~Swettenham et al., 1998! that chil-
dren with autism spend relatively less time
looking at people.
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Our second prediction was more specific.
Here we were concerned to evaluate the qual-
ity of the joint attention shown by partici-
pants. Bearing much in common with the work
of Adamson and Bakeman ~1985!, Bruner
~1981!, Hornick and Gunnar ~1988!, Kasari
et al. ~1990!, and Mundy et al. ~1992!, we also
considered that much of joint attention may
express sharing of affective experience. We
wanted to explore whether one can make mean-
ingful distinctions among different forms of
joint attention, which may involve varying de-
grees of sharing of experience and ~according
to our hypothesis! identification with another
person. There was high reliability in the rat-
ings of sharing looks, and these looks proved
to be less prevalent among participants with
autism, but this was also the case for checking
and orienting looks. Therefore, all forms of
joint attention were less frequently observed
among participants with autism. In contrast,
two-thirds of participants with autism never
showed a “sharing” look, whereas this was the
case for one-third of the comparison group.
Individual profiles of looking revealed how
only among participants with autism were there
significantly fewer individuals who showed
any sharing look, than who showed any check-
ing and0or orienting look. Of interest, all but
one of the five children with autism who
showed a sharing look were under 10 years
old, suggesting that interpersonal engagement
may have a complex developmental course.
However, because sharing looks tended to be
less frequent than other kinds of look for both
groups of participants, and the children with
autism tended to show fewer looks of all kinds,
one should not overestimate the specificity of
the dearth of sharing looks.
Our third and critical prediction was that
sharing looks, and only sharing looks, would
relate to imitation of self-0other orientation.
The results indicated that, indeed, participants
in each group who showed sharing looks tended
to be those who imitated the demonstrator’s
self-0other orientation, whereas all those with
the lowest scores of self-0other orientation also
showed a complete absence of sharing looks.
Here it should be recalled that our previous
study had shown how as a group, children
with autism were limited in their propensity to
transpose a demonstrator’s actions in relation
to herself into actions in relation to them-
selves. Despite these differences in overall lev-
els of performance, there remained sufficient
within-group variance to establish that within
each group, individual differences in sharing
looks corresponded with individual differ-
ences in imitating self-0other orientation in
actions. More detailed analyses of individual
response patterns elaborated this picture, for
instance in revealing that only one of the five
children with autism who showed a predomi-
nance of geometric ~i.e., exact! repetition in
the imitation task ever engaged in a sharing
look, and all tended to be object-focused in
looking.
Several aspects of the results deserve spe-
cial consideration. First, they were derived
from groups of relatively modest size, and
replication is needed. Sample sizes this small
do not allow for a reliable estimate of the true
level of association among variables because
the confidence limits around correlations, and
differences between correlations, are large.
Second, all the children were “on task” nearly
all the time, in that looks away from the object
acted upon and0or the person of the demon-
strator were few in number and brief in dura-
tion. Therefore, the group difference in overall
looks to the tester was not simply the result of
global inattentiveness among participants with
autism; rather, it represented a different de-
ployment of attention ~perhaps more accu-
rately, a different pattern of psychological
engagement with person and object! by par-
ticipants in the two groups. It is important to
note that not only looks to share, but also
looks to check and looks to orientate in rela-
tion to the demonstrator, were less frequent
among participants with autism. Whatever mo-
tivates a participant to look to someone else in
a testing situation such as this, therefore, and
whatever the draw to giving some form of
attention to the other person, something that
extends beyond a wish to share experiences,
this distinguishes individuals with and with-
out autism. Perhaps it would be more accurate
to state that the groups differed in the relative
“pull” toward objects and people, in that it is
possible that participants with autism became
~relatively, albeit not markedly! fixed in look-
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ing at the objects. Therefore, at this level of
description, one might consider the group dif-
ference to reflect a distinction in terms of so-
cial orientation ~Dawson, Meltzoff, Osterling,
Rinaldi, & Brown, 1998; Mundy & Neal,
2001!.
Third, it is not clear whether the results
reflect something enduring about individual
differences among participants, something
about the connection between their pattern of
engagement in this particular setting and their
imitative performance, or some mixture of the
two. For instance, one can imagine that on a
given day an individual of either group might
feel less than usually inclined to become in-
volved with the tester, and for this reason de-
ploy his or her attention to the objects of the
task and as a result fail to imitate self-0other
orientation. Such a person might behave dif-
ferently on another occasion, even though the
relation between sharing looks and imitation
might still hold. Although such a possibility
does not undermine the observed group differ-
ences, it does serve to highlight how the ex-
perimental procedure provides a very brief
snapshot of a particular set of goings on.
Fourth and finally, it is important to note
that although the results indicated that specif-
ically sharing looks ~and not other kinds of
look! were related to imitating self-0other ori-
entation, we did not examine whether sharing
looks were related to other aspects of imita-
tion. Earlier we cited evidence that among
children with autism, joint attention may be
related to the children’s ability to imitate other
kinds of action. Therefore, it remains to estab-
lish how far the present results reflect a “spe-
cial case” of the relation between a specific
form of joint attention and a specific form of
imitation, or how far this relation might apply
more broadly. Indeed, it is possible ~and we
believe, likely! that the processes that nor-
mally promote sharing forms of joint attention
and role-sensitive adjustments in imitative be-
havior also operate to motivate attentiveness
to and imitation of other people in more gen-
eral respects.
These considerations bear upon the choice
of which among several approaches might be
most appropriate in interpreting the results.
For example, one might focus on domain-
general abilities such as participants’ atten-
tion regulation skills ~e.g., Hughes & Russell,
1993; Landry & Bryson, 2004!, and consider
how those individuals who fail to sustain or
distribute their attention in a typical way might
show few sharing looks and at the same time,
fail to notice or copy all aspects of demon-
strated actions. From the perspective of social–
cognitive mental representation ~e.g., Frith,
Morton, & Leslie, 1991!, in contrast, one might
consider that individuals who fail to “decou-
ple” their own and others’ representations of
the world would not only show limited joint
attention vis-à-vis the world, but also a lack of
sensitivity to ~and imitation of ! the kinds of
person-anchored stance tested here. Even if
one adopts a theoretical framework concerned
with the structure of self–other relations, it
might be possible to explain the present find-
ings in terms of disturbances in the self-0other
monitoring of actions ~e.g., Russell & Jarrold,
1999! rather than deficits in interpersonal en-
gagement. Finally, given that participants’ rates
of smiling during the sharing looks in our study
were similar to rates previously reported for
rates of positive affect in joint attention ~Kasari
et al., 1990; Mundy et al., 1992!, one might
focus on the children’s difficulties in express-
ing and sharing affect during joint attention.
We do not know whether advocates for each
of these positions would have predicted our
findings, and so we acknowledge that the study
cannot rule out explanations that either con-
flict with our own, or offer a complementary
account on a different level of explanation.
Consider what is perhaps the most plausi-
ble alternative explanation for the present find-
ings: the social-orienting model of autism
proposed by Mundy and Neal ~2001!. These
authors suggest that “an early cardinal deficit
in social-orienting and joint attention contrib-
utes to a severe impoverishment of social in-
formation processing input during infancy and
preschool development in children with au-
tism” ~pp. 139–140!. This disturbance “may
reflect an early onset error in sensitivity to the
reward value of social interaction . . . @but# the
mechanism of attenuation in social reward sen-
sitivity is poorly understood at this time”
~pp. 151–152!. Importantly, and like our own
hypothesis, this account stresses the motiva-
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tional ~and potentially, affective! as well as
cognitively structuring aspects of propensities
to engage with other persons. Whether or not
identification is as foundational as we believe,
and whether a limited propensity to identify
with others explains the “attenuation in social
reward sensitivity” among persons with au-
tism, it remains important for alternative theo-
ries such as the social-orienting account to
explain role-reversing aspects of communica-
tion and imitation and the interpersonally
grounded movements in stance manifest among
typically developing infants of around 1 year
old, and relatively limited among those with
autism. Arguably, the notion of identification
is also apt for explaining why, if one applies
appropriate measures to assess qualities of in-
terpersonal relatedness, then one finds evi-
dence of marked impairment in autism ~e.g.,
García-Pérez, Lee, & Hobson, in press; Hob-
son & Lee, 1999!.
Finally, there are philosophical and logical
reasons why one might invoke a process like
identification to explain how sharing of ex-
periences ~Hobson, 1989!, or adjustment of
perspective through responsiveness to the at-
titudes of others, or the emergence of reflec-
tive self-awareness ~Cooley, 1902; Hobson,
1990; Mead, 1934!, or even the acquisition of
context-sensitive language and creative sym-
bolic thinking ~Adamson, 1995; Hobson, 2000;
Werner & Kaplan, 1963!, emerge in the course
of early development. Sharing experiences en-
tails that to some degree, one participates in
another person’s psychological stance vis-à-
vis objects or events, so that one achieves a
now expanded subjective state. As the philos-
opher Campbell ~2002! describes, in sharing
it is constitutive of your experience that the
other is, with you, attending to something ~and
for related perspectives see Bråten, 1998; De-
cety & Sommerville, 2003; Hobson, 1993,
200202004; Gallese & Goldman, 1998; Melt-
zoff & Brooks, 2001; Mundy, 2003; Toma-
sello, 1995!.
There remains much to discover about the
bases for, and development of, the process or
processes of identification. The most in-depth
treatment of identification has been within
psychoanalytic writings, and it is clear that
although Freud ~195501921! considered iden-
tification to be a basic feature of mental life
that underlies empathy, he also wrote of more
complex forms such as identification with one’s
father. It is not surprising that the notion of
identification has links with other current ac-
count of self–other connectedness such as those
inspired by neurofunctional evidence for mir-
ror neurones ~e.g., Decety & Sommerville,
2003; Gallese, 2001! and theoretical treat-
ments of early imitation, especially by Melt-
zoff ~e.g., Meltzoff & Moore, 1998a!. There is
also evidence from functional magnetic reso-
nance imaging findings ~Dapretto et al., 2006!
and EEG patterns of mu frequency suppres-
sion ~Oberman et al., 2005! that such function-
ing may be atypical among children with
autism ~Williams, Whiten, Suddendorf, & Per-
rett, 2001!. The points we stress are, first, that
we are dealing with the propensity to be moved
into the psychological stance of another per-
son, even as one relates to that someone else
from one’s own position and, second, that this
involves being moved in attitude and affective
orientation, not merely copying actions. Inso-
far as this structure of self–other engagement
~being drawn into and encompassing the ori-
entation of the other so that this yields sharing
of subjective mental states and at the same
time a new potential orientation for oneself !
is critical in shaping one’s experience of so-
cial relations, identification provides the basis
for a developmental series of increasingly elab-
orated representations of self–other relatedness.
Such an account has important implica-
tions for understanding typical development,
as well as for characterizing the developmen-
tal psychopathology of autism. For example,
differences in children’s ability to incorporate
the attitudes of others through identification
may have significant implications for their
achieving new perspectives or “takes” in rela-
tion to the world ~through imitation, social
referencing, joint attention, and so on!, a new
reflective stance in relation to themselves and
their own mental contents ~as in metarepresen-
tation!, and the development of social emo-
tions such as guilt and concern ~Hobson,
Chidambi, Lee, & Meyer, 2006!. Corre-
spondingly, if it is the case that children with
autism are limited in the propensity to identify
with others, then this may contribute to their
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relative lack of initiative in creating or respond-
ing to new conceptual perspectives, as well as
to their restricted and abnormal linguistic and
social–communicative repertoires and limita-
tions in executive functioning ~e.g., Dawson
et al., 2002; García-Pérez et al., in press; Grif-
fith, Pennington, Wehner, & Rogers, 1999;
Minshew, Meyer, & Goldstein, 2002!.
It remains to consider how one might con-
duct further tests of the hypothesis that chil-
dren with autism have a limited propensity to
identify with other people. There is a diffi-
culty here: there may be sustained joint atten-
tion or alternating looks between the world
and someone else that reflect only minimal or
moderate amounts of sharing of experience,
or instances when the copying of actions may
not be the outcome of engagement with the
person who acts ~as discussed in Hobson &
Lee, 1999!. From a complementary perspec-
tive, the pull to identify with someone else
may account for a part of the propensity to
imitate at all, even when the copying is of
goal-directed actions ~where identification need
not structure the form of the imitation!. There-
fore, one challenge for future studies is to find
new ways to examine whether there are in-
deed aspects of psychological functioning that
are potentially dissociable according to whether
or not they entail identification, and whether
these bear meaningful relations to one an-
other. For example, we have adopted this
perspective in designing studies involving par-
ticipants with autism on nonverbal communi-
cation ~and specifically the coordination of
head shaking and nodding between conversa-
tional partners: García-Pérez et al., in press!,
imitation ~and specifically the imitation of
“style”: Hobson & Lee, 1999; Hobson &
Meyer, 2007!; and the use of personal pro-
nouns ~e.g., Lee, Hobson, & Chiat, 1994!. Each
of these approaches affords the opportunity to
evaluate the degree to which individuals ei-
ther relate to “surface” features of behavior or
communication, or perceive, adapt to, and
adopt the person-anchored stance that such
behavior or communication expresses. There
is scope to extend such studies to changes in
an individual’s repertoire over time, for in-
stance in relation to self-regulation or the abil-
ity to apply concepts flexibly.
We conclude by returning from the big pic-
ture to more local outcomes of this study. The
present results represent new and challenging
findings about the nature of joint attention
deficits in individuals with autism. Not only
are such individuals less likely to look to an-
other person when copying that person’s ac-
tions on objects, but they are also less prone to
engage in sharing looks, and when this is the
case, they are also less likely to imitate the
self-0other-orientated aspects of the actions
demonstrated. To explain this pattern of re-
sults, it may be necessary to take account of a
broad set of social–relational phenomena char-
acteristic of typical and atypical development,
and to rethink what an individual brings to
and takes from experiences of interpersonal
engagement. Future research promises to re-
veal how far aspects of self–other relatedness
that entail sharing and role flexibility are de-
velopmentally significant for the emergence
and operation of higher cognitive functioning
as well as for shaping social relations.
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